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External financing of local public goods can potentially create ‘political re-
source curses’ by reducing citizen oversight, exacerbating elite capture, and
producing policy outcomes that are sub-optimal for the general population.
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capture of local development projects. Whereas control communities are pro-
vided with block grants to fund local public goods, households in treatment
communities are provided with vouchers that they may either contribute to
a public good or redeem at a discount for a private capital good. We find
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1 Introduction
In works as far back as Montesquieu’s “Spirit of the Laws”,1 social scientists have
argued that the accountability of political authorities is influenced by the nature
of public revenue. Where revenues are derived predominantly from resource rents
instead of direct taxation, citizens are less likely to exert demands on their leaders,
which in turn adversely affects the quality and quantity of public goods (Brollo et al.
(2013); Herb (2005)). Such theories of a “political resource curse” are frequently
applied to explain the prevalence of poor governance and low levels of economic
growth among oil-exporting states (Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006)). A number
of works - including Tilly (1992) and Bates and Lien (1985) - further document how
conflict-induced imperatives for revenue generation in medieval Europe resulted in
the imposition of direct taxation and, with it, the formation of bargains between
elites and citizens that ultimately improved the quality of governance. Herbst (2000)
analogously argues that low levels of direct taxation and the corresponding absence
of citizen-elite bargains underscores poor governance in many African states.
As a number of economists have argued, official development assistance (here-
after, aid) may also generate political resource curses by reducing the reliance of
authorities on direct taxation to fund the provision of public goods (Djankov, Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol (2008); Rajan and Subramanian (2007)). In response to
this problem, a number of development practitioners and researchers have developed
modalities that seek to reduce the adverse effects that external financing of develop-
ment projects may have on the accountability of local and nationals leaders. Among
such modalities are community-driven development (hereafter, CDD) programs and
social investment funds, which both involve local communities in the selection and
management of projects. In addition to enabling the incorporation of local informa-
tion on the marginal value of different public investments (Alatas et al. (2012)), the
emphasis placed by such decentralization initiatives on local participation seeks to
encourage community members to monitor the performance of political authorities
in delivering the public goods funded by these programs (Fung and Wright (2003)).
Evidence indicates, however, that local public decision-making is often subject
to capture by local elites. As such, decentralization initiatives may merely localize
the political resource curse. Various studies, for instance, note that participants
in local public decision-making are generally wealthier, more educated, hold higher
1See “Book XIII. Of the Relation Which the Levying of Taxes and the Greatness of the Public
Revenues Bear to Liberty”.
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social status, and are more politically connected than non-participants (Mansuri and
Rao (2013); Pradhan, Rao and Rosemberg (2010); Arcand and Fafchamps (2012);
Mansuri (2012)). As a result, the outcomes of local public decision-making often
align with the preferences of local elites (Fritzen (2007); Labonne and Chase (2009);
Rao and Ibanez (2005)). While such elite capture is not necessarily detrimental to the
general interest if it enables better-informed yet benevolent elites to exert heightened
influence, Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2017) find that villagers perceive that
they are worse off in cases where elites have more influence over project selection.
In a related experimental study, Beath, Christia and Enikolopov (2013) find that a
CDD program adversely affected the quality of decision-making by local leaders, a
result that Brick (2008) suggests is caused by the effect of external financing on the
accountability relationships between local leaders and the community.2
To date, innovations to reduce elite capture of externally-financed local public
goods have met with limited success. Many CDD programs, for example, employ fa-
cilitators who guide communities through a needs identification and implementation
process (Mansuri and Rao, 2013), although the presence of facilitators appears to
shift the project choices toward the preferences of the facilitators themselves (Plat-
teau and Gaspart, 2003). Olken (2010) studies another means of limiting elite cap-
ture - the use of referenda to enable villagers to select local projects from a menu
provided by a CDD program - and finds that, while referenda improve citizen satis-
faction, they do not change the type of projects that were selected.3 Beath, Christia
and Enikolopov (2017) replicate the experiment in the context of a CDD program
in Afghanistan and observe that referenda induce a small change in the influence
of elites over project selection, but do not increase the effectiveness of implemented
projects. Efforts to improve the accountability of local leaders and service providers
through increasing community monitoring have similarly proved to be of limited ef-
fectiveness. (Olken, 2007), for instance, finds that community-based monitoring is
less effective than traditional top-down monitoring in reducing corruption of local
public spending in Indonesia. Banerjee et al. (2010) also find that efforts to promote
increased participation of beneficiaries in the monitoring of public services in India
2A related experimental literature shows the correlation between leaders preferences and commu-
nity members behavior, from cooperation (Kosfeld and Rustagi (2015)) to contributions to public
goods and private investment (Beekman, Bulte and Nillesen (2014), Jack and Recalde (2015))
3This result is consistent with evidence on individual valuation of decision processes, indepen-
dently from decision outcomes (Guth and Weck-Hannemann (1997), Fehr, Herz and Wilkening
(2013), Bartling, Fehr and Herz (2014), Owens, Grossman and Fackler (2014)), and on control
aversion among individuals (Falk and Kosfeld (2006)).
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were generally ineffective in increasing community involvement or in improving the
quality of services.
In this paper, we present a novel mechanism to reduce elite capture of local public
decision-making by channelling external resources to fund public goods through citi-
zens. The mechanism provides households in villages covered by a CDD project with
‘vouchers’ which households may either contribute to the cost of a proposed local de-
velopment project or which they may redeem at a discount for a private capital good.
By providing villagers with the collective ability to de-fund a non-accountable local
authority and by establishing the private opportunity cost of public expenditure,
this ‘voucher-based’ modality seeks to encourage the formation of a ‘fiscal social
contract’ between elites and villagers. As such, it is envisaged that the modality
will increase the incentive for local authorities to propose and/or support publicly-
beneficial projects and will increase villager participation in project selection and
monitoring, thereby resulting in higher quality projects.
To test the effects of vouchers on project selection, we administered a field ex-
periment across 80 villages in the Solomon Islands, a country where local authorities
have historically exercised authority over local public decision-making. The field ex-
periment was centred around structured community activities, or SCAs, as in (Casey,
Glennerster and Miguel, 2012). In each village, 20 randomly-selected adults were pro-
vided with 10 notes, which could be redeemed for either 10 Solomon Islander dollars
(SBD 10, approximatively USD 1.40) each if contributed to a public fund, or SBD 5
each if retained for private consumption. In the control villages, the maximum fund
amount (SBD 2,000, approximately USD 300) was provided as a block grant with
no individual contributions required and no possibility for households to retain any
portion of the grant for private consumption. In both treatment and control commu-
nities, the public fund could be used to purchase items selected by participants from
a pre-set menu of materials at a local hardware supplier. Importantly, participants
made their decisions anonymously, thereby avoiding the potential for intimidation
and retribution. Apart from the way in which the funds were distributed, all features
of the process were the same across both treatment arms.
The results of the experiment indicate that the use of vouchers substantially alters
both the selection process and allocation outcomes, although the effects on project
implementation outcomes and general welfare are ambiguous. Compared to con-
trol villages, the voucher-based modality increases the duration of discussions about
project selection among participants and the average number of times community
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members speak during such discussions. The voucher treatment changes the types
of project that are selected by the group and, specifically, increases the probability
of health-related interventions receiving funding. Villagers also perceive project out-
comes to be fairer under the voucher scheme. The treatment effects on participation
in the discussion and fairness perceptions are stronger for individuals who had not
previously taken part in community decision-making. As expected, however, the
voucher scheme reduces the volume of funding available to villages, with treatment
villages receiving just 79 percent of funds available (58% of the total available in
public good contributions, 21% in private cash). With available data, we are unable
to assess whether this reduced flow of funds was associated with reduced welfare.
Furthermore, with the limited data available, we do not observe differences between
control and treatment communities in the speed with which they obtain materials
and implement selected projects.
The paper is divided into seven sections: Section 2 describes the setting, ex-
perimental design and implementation; Section 3 outlines our hypotheses; Section 4
describes the sources of data and provides summary statistics for the sample; Section
5 presents the results of the experiment; Section 6 discusses the results; and Section
7 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Sample Villages
The study occurred over June - August 2013 across 80 villages randomly sampled
from the population of villages participating in the Solomon Islands Rural Develop-
ment Program (RDP). Launched in 2008, RDP was implemented by the Solomon
Islands’ Ministry of Development and Planning and Aid Coordination (MDPAC)
and was supported by AusAID, IFAD, and the World Bank. A CDD program, RDP
financed investments identified by villagers through a participatory process. Exist-
ing local institutions (e.g., tribal councils and churches) planned and managed RDP
activities at the community-level and supervised implementation of small works.
As in other cases, our sample was limited by budgetary constraints, and cross-
village treatment effects are thus limited in available precision for some outcomes.
We discuss the minimum detectable effects implied by our estimates with each of our
primary cross-village results.
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The 80 sample villages are small (average population of 488 people) and isolated.
The average travel time to the respective provincial capitals is 12 hours and it takes
an average of two-and-a-half days to reach the capital. The vast majority of villagers
(82%) rely on subsistence fishing and horticulture. Most villages do not have access
to electricity, running water or sanitation. Four out of every five households use
rainwater catchments for drinking water, only have access to solar lamps for lighting,
and lack access to improved sanitation. In this context, the financing provided by
RDP offers a vital opportunity to upgrade local public facilities and services.
Given the isolation of the sample villages, formal government structures are of
limited relevance. Most of the villages (85%) are governed by traditional village
chiefs, with elected leaders (8%) and/or church leaders (13%) providing local gover-
nance services in a much smaller proportion of communities.4 All villages have one
or more churches, which also serve as the community hall for meetings. Religion is
an important part of daily life, with nearly all villagers claiming a religious affilia-
tion. In the sample villages, the predominant denominations are the United Church
(28%), Seventh Day Adventist (27%), Catholic (25%), and South Seas Evangelical
(22%).
2.2 Intervention
In the 80 sample villages, leaders were asked to invite all available adults to a com-
munity meeting on a specified date. Attendees of this meeting represent the sam-
pling frame for the participants in the experiment.5 From this frame, 18 villagers (9
male and 9 female) were selected via a random drawing of names. In addition, the
two highest-ranking leaders (one male, one female) were selected from among those
present at the meeting. The community meeting was then adjourned, with only the
individuals selected to participate asked to remain.
In all villages, selected participants were informed that SBD 2,000 had been
allocated to fund the improvement of a local non-religious public facility, such as a
4A number of villages have more than one type of village leader.
5It is possible that leaders may have selectively invited villagers to the meeting and/or that
villagers may have self-selected based on their needs and/or capacity to exercise voice. Using data
concurrently provided by a random sample of 10 households in each village, we find that participants
have slightly higher ownership of toilets than non-participants, but exhibit lower levels of access to
primary schools and health clinics. There is also no difference between the correlation of project
preferences of leaders and participants and the correlation of the project preferences of leaders and
non-participants. Overall, there is no evidence to indicate that the participant selection process
was substantially affected by leaders and/or by self-selection.
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school, health center, market, toilet, road, or water system (i.e., a well or irrigation
system).6 Facilitators directed participants to discuss the type of project that they
believed would most benefit the community, with the goal of reaching a consensus on
which project to fund. In order to ensure the norms of discussion and decision-making
adhered to those of the community, no structure was imposed on the form of the
discussion or on the method of selection of the project. Facilitators did not intervene
in the discussion until an agreement was reached, but rather passively recorded who
spoke and for how long. At the conclusion of the discussion, facilitators directed
participants to complete a form identifying the type of project and which materials
they intended to purchase. Following the completion of the form, participants in all
sample villages were paid a small fee for participating in the activity.7
2.3 Description of Treatment
Sample villages were randomly allocated to either the control or treatment group,
which differed in the mode of fund allocation.8 Any treatment-specific information
was revealed to participants after they had been selected. In villages assigned to
the control group, facilitators informed participants that a block grant of SBD 2,000
would be allocated to fund the community project. In the treatment group and
prior to the discussion, facilitators issued each of the 20 selected participants with
10 paper vouchers and explained that each voucher could either be redeemed for
cash or contributed to the fund for the community project. If redeemed, vouchers
would be worth SBD 5 each, whereas vouchers contributed to the project would be
worth SBD 10 each.9 Following the discussion and project selection, participants in
the treatment group were asked by the facilitator to indicate privately how many of
the vouchers they wished to redeem and how many they wished to contribute to the
community project.
6The fund was provided as credit at a local hardware store and permitted the purchase of
materials required for the work (such as paint, roofing iron, and/or cement). Villagers were required
to provide labor and complementary materials for the selected project and one participant was
selected to record community contributions and the use of allocated funds. Participants were also
asked to nominate the person responsible for procuring materials from the hardware store.
7All activities were conducted in spaces protected from outsiders’ intrusions, such as local schools
or public buildings.
8Randomization was stratified within provinces.
9Thus, if a participant redeemed all vouchers for cash, they would receive SBD 50 (approximately
USD 7.50), roughly equal to 5 percent of the average monthly income.
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3 Hypotheses
The provision of vouchers to participants may affect selection processes and outcomes
by changing the structure of incentives facing local leaders to build consensus. In
control villages, leaders preferring a particular project need only to convince a plural-
ity of participants that the projects expected benefits exceed those of other potential
projects. In treatment villages, however, participants may decide to withhold part
or all of the funding for the respective project if they are not convinced that the ben-
efits that will accrue to them from the selected project will exceed the redemption
value of vouchers. As a result of this and the fact that participants decisions over
the use of the vouchers are made after project selection, leaders seeking to maximize
funding for their preferred project must ensure the involvement of all participants in
the decision-making process and seek direct assurances from participants that they
support the project choice. In contrast, during discussions in control villages, lead-
ers face an incentive to minimize participation in order to reduce the probability of
dissent over the relative benefits of project options.
The use of vouchers to select projects may also increase the willingness of villagers
to participate in discussions about project selection by changing the framing of the
selection process. As noted in Section 2.1 above, the sample villages generally adhere
to a customary governance structure dominated by unelected village chiefs that derive
their authority from their lineage and/or economic wealth. Decisions over the use of
local public resources such as project selection are ordinarily the domain of these
local elites, with social norms discouraging villagers from challenging the decisions of
such elites in a public setting. In this context, the use of vouchers potentially creates
a new frame for local public decision-making which provides individual participants
with special authority over selection outcomes. As a result of this change of frame and
the associated relaxation of social norms that govern local public decision-making,
non-elite villagers may be more willing to actively participate in the selection process.
In so far as the use of vouchers to select projects increases active participation by
community members, vouchers also should increase the extent to which non-leader
participants announce their preferences over the menu of projects. In the event
that such preferences generally differ from those of leaders and where uncertainty
over other participants preferences otherwise exists, the discussion would thereby
facilitate the aggregation of such preferences and increase the probability of their
realization. Furthermore, if leaders prefer the implementation of any project to no
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project, the use of vouchers may cause leaders to accept a selection outcome that
they do not prefer in order to ensure that participants do not redeem vouchers and
deprive the village of a project.
By increasing incentives for local leaders to encourage participation and to accept
project outcomes that they do not necessarily prefer and by relaxing social norms
that may otherwise inhibit participation, vouchers should increase participation by
marginalized community members, improve the correspondence between participant
preferences and selection outcomes, and improve satisfaction both with the process
and the outcomes. In particular, the study tests the following hypotheses relating
the treatment to various outcomes of interest:10
1. Vouchers increase participation in project selection, as measured by the dura-
tion and inclusiveness of discussions on project selection;
2. Vouchers increase the correspondence between selected projects and preferences
of the median non-elite participant and preferences of marginalized participants
who do not ordinarily participate in community decisions;
3. Vouchers improve the fairness of the project selection process as perceived by
participants and satisfaction of participants with the selected project.
To account for multiple comparisons that arise because we test effects on multiple
outcomes and across multiple subgroups, we follow Anderson (2008). Specifically,
we create weighted indices when analyzing multiple outcomes in a single hypothesis
(generally those presented in a single table) and sharpened q-values when analyzing
multiple subgroups.
10These hypotheses were documented in a pre-analysis plan completed before the data collection.
The pre-analysis plan also included hypotheses relating the treatment to the likelihood of projects
being implemented and to the quality of projects. However, the available data does not allow us
to test these hypotheses, as only a small number of communities had collected the material and
started to work on the projects three months after the intervention. For this reason, we do not test
any hypotheses pertaining to project implementation. However, the respective results are discussed
briefly in Section 5.
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4 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Data Sources
Data to estimate the effects of the treatment and to explore heterogeneity in treat-
ment effects was collected across four stages in all sample villages:11
1. Prior to the discussion, a short questionnaire was administered to all selected
participants. Participants (including participating leaders) were asked to pro-
vide an ordinal ranking of the top three buildings that they believed should be
improved with a hypothetical SI$2000 grant. They were provided with the fol-
lowing nine options: kindergarten, primary school, health clinic, water system,
sanitation, market, road / bridge / wharf, or another non-church community
building.12
2. During the discussion in all sample villages, the facilitator recorded the number
of speaking interventions by each participant per five minutes and the total
length of the discussion.
3. Following the discussion, an additional short questionnaire was administered
to participants. The survey collected information on demographic and socio-
economic characteristics, prior experience with community organizations, per-
ception of the decision process and outcome of the SCA, and satisfaction with
the local leadership. The survey also collected information on participants will-
ingness to share resources with others when nothing is expected in return, a
proxy of altruism.13
4. Information on community characteristics was collected by facilitators from a
sample of key informants, such as village elders and other local leaders.
11Voucher contributions are also observed for participants assigned to treatment villages.
12An additional project type, church buildings, was overwhelmingly cited by respondents in the
‘other projects’ category, and so was assigned a separate category ex-post for the analysis.
13This question is shown to correlate strongly with choices in the dictator game, a behavioral
game commonly used to capture altruism (Falk et al., 2013). This question was asked after the
discussion in order to avoid priming subjects to act cooperatively, as evidence shows how focusing
individual attention on social norms affects behavior in subsequent experimental tasks (Krupka and
Weber, 2009). Although this raises the possibility that the altruism measure is influenced by the
treatment, we do not find evidence of a treatment effect on it (see Table 1).
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5. Approximately three months after the discussion, an enumerator returned to
65 communities to assess project progress as measured by the procurement and
installation of materials funded by the intervention.14
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
4.2.1 Participant Characteristics
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. The first 6 Columns report means and
standard deviations for control villages (Columns 1-2), treatment villages (Columns
3-4) and the full sample (Columns 5-6), while the last Column reports p-values for
balance between the treatment and control groups across each variable.15
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes participant characteristics. Consistent with re-
cruitment protocols, exactly half of the sample in both treatment and control com-
munities is female. 26 percent of participants are under the age of 30, 18 percent
report owning no fixed assets (such as a boat or a bicycle), and only 11 percent list a
primary source of income other than farming or fishing.16 55 percent of participants
report that they either didn’t attend any community meetings over the previous five
years or did not speak at any of the meetings.17. Finally, the mean response to the
altruism question is 8.3 on a scale from 1 to 10. Across all of the aforementioned
characteristics, the sample is balanced between treatment and control groups.
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes ex-ante project preferences of participants. More
than a third of participants ranked the local kindergarten as their most preferred op-
tion, while sanitation (15%) and water supply (12%) were the second and third most
popular first choices respectively (and most frequently ranked as second choices).
In 59 percent of villages, kindergarten was the most frequently reported top ranked
preference among all participants, while sanitation was the most frequently reported
top ranked preference in 15 percent of villages. Participants preferences over project
types are balanced across treatment and control villages, with the exception of those
over health centers (p = 0.018), while leader preferences are imbalanced over water
14Data was not collected from 25 communities due to inaccessibility.
15P-values are calculated by regressing each variable on a treatment dummy and province fixed-
effects, with standard errors clustered at the village level when the outcome variable is at the
individual level, and robust standard errors otherwise.
16In the analysis, the latter two measures are used to proxy for respondents’ income.
17In the analysis, this measure is used to proxy for marginalization. This measure is significantly
negatively correlated with leadership status and wealth and significantly positively correlated with
being female and being aged under 30 (Table A1).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Control Treatment Total P-value
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Panel A: Participant Characteristics
Female 0.500 (0.500) 0.500 (0.500) 0.500 (0.500) .
Under-30 0.256 (0.437) 0.255 (0.436) 0.256 (0.436) 0.967
Own Assets 0.175 (0.380) 0.176 (0.381) 0.176 (0.381) 0.969
Off-Farm Income 0.108 (0.310) 0.121 (0.327) 0.114 (0.318) 0.493
Limited Participation 0.537 (0.499) 0.560 (0.497) 0.549 (0.498) 0.416
Altruism 8.331 (2.324) 8.335 (2.266) 8.333 (2.294) 0.968
Panel B: Primary Project Preference
Kindergarten 0.357 (0.480) 0.311 (0.463) 0.334 (0.472) 0.256
Primary School 0.102 (0.303) 0.090 (0.286) 0.096 (0.295) 0.518
Health Center 0.064 (0.244) 0.106 (0.308) 0.085 (0.279) 0.018
Roads 0.016 (0.127) 0.022 (0.148) 0.019 (0.138) 0.384
Market 0.029 (0.167) 0.045 (0.207) 0.037 (0.189) 0.115
Water 0.121 (0.327) 0.121 (0.327) 0.121 (0.327) 1.000
Sanitation 0.136 (0.343) 0.171 (0.377) 0.154 (0.361) 0.354
Community Bldg. 0.029 (0.167) 0.036 (0.187) 0.032 (0.177) 0.483
Church 0.092 (0.290) 0.076 (0.266) 0.084 (0.278) 0.541
Note: p-values from regressions of outcome on treatment and province fixed-effects.
11
and sanitation projects.18 When looking at the aggregate distribution of project
preferences across treatment and control villages, a chi-square test does not reject
the hypothesis that both overall preferences and leaders preferences are drawn from
the same distribution (p = .878 and p = .114, respectively).
Across the sample, leaders preferences diverge from those of other community
members, particularly for health, sanitation, and school projects (Figure 1). Specifi-
cally, 12.5 percent of leaders prioritize the improvement of health facilities, compared
to 8.5 percent of participants overall (two-sided t-test, p = .093). Similarly, sanita-
tion is prioritized by 20.6 percent of leaders versus 15.4 percent of all participants
(p = .038). Conversely, primary schools are preferred by 9.6 percent of participants
generally, but just 5.6 percent of leaders (p = .026). A chi-square test rejects the
hypothesis that the distributions of preferences of these two groups are the same (p
= .024).
Among other sub-groups, women have stronger preferences for kindergarten and
lower preferences for sanitation projects than men. Sanitation is also less popular
among under-30, poor and marginalised participants. Young respondents are also
more likely to rank primary education projects at the top.19 These results are re-
assuring, as they show how preferences align with the types of public goods that
individuals are likely to need most (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004).
4.2.2 Selection Process
Discussions among participants on the selection last an average of 12.7 minutes in
control communities and 15.4 minutes in treatment communities, with the difference
significant at the 5 percent level (Table 2). The effect of the treatment on discussion
duration appears to arise from a shifting of the right tail of the distribution: only
15 percent of control communities have discussions that last 20 minutes or longer,
while 38 percent of treatment communities do so. The increase in the duration of
discussions in treatment villages is due to an increase in individual participation,
both on the extensive and intensive margins. The treatment increases the share of
participants speaking during the discussion by 4.1 percentage points over the control
group level of 39.5 percent. The treatment also causes participants to speak more:
the average number of five minute intervals during which a participant speaks is 0.67
in control villages, compared to 0.83 in treatment villages. These differences are
18Table A2 reports balance tests for preferences over projects by other relevant sub-groups.
19Results available upon request.
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Figure 1: Relative Preferences over Project Types and Effect on Type of Selected
Project
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statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels for duration of the discussion
and number of interventions, respectively (Table 2).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Outcome variables
Control Treatment Total P-value
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Voucher Contributions 29.085 (12.169)
Speaker 0.395 (0.489) 0.436 (0.496) 0.416 (0.493) 0.216
Interventions (a) 0.668 (1.000) 0.835 (1.157) 0.751 (1.083) 0.063
Discussion Duration 12.69 (5.110) 15.38 (6.726) 14.04 (6.087) 0.030
Match All (b) 0.250 (0.439) 0.350 (0.483) 0.300 (0.461) 0.302
Match Leader 0.400 (0.496) 0.375 (0.490) 0.388 (0.490) 0.813
Satisfaction 0.869 (0.338) 0.927 (0.259) 0.898 (0.303) 0.005
Fair Process 0.859 (0.348) 0.912 (0.283) 0.886 (0.318) 0.020
Note: p-values from regressions of outcome on treatment and province fixed-effects. ”Speaker” is equal
to 1 if a subject spoke during the discussion. ”Interventions” represents the number of five minute
intervals during which a subject spoke. ”Match All” indicates a correspondence between the selected
project and the modal priority of participants.
4.2.3 Voucher Contributions
In communities assigned to the treatment group, contributions by participants av-
eraged SBD 29 (Table 2) and ranged between the feasible minimum of SBD 0 and
the feasible maximum of SBD 50, with a mode at SBD 25 (Figure 2). Contributions
generally decrease monotonically on both sides of the mode, with the exception that
13.3 percent of participants contributed the full amount possible. Only 0.6 percent
of participants contributed zero. These contribution levels are higher than those typ-
ically observed in laboratory experiments using one-shot games, where contribution
rates are often approximately 40 percent.
Voucher contributions are correlated with individual characteristics (Table 3).
Column 1 reports results of the regression of individuals’ voucher contributions on
demographic characteristics and province fixed effects. Purposively-selected leader
participants contribute about SBD 2.7 more than the average participant. An effect
of similar magnitude is observed for participants with off-farm income, which serves
as a proxy for high socioeconomic status. However, not owning any assets is not
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Figure 2: Voucher Contributions
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significantly correlated with lower contributions.20 Participants under 30 years of
age contribute SBD 2 dollars less. Differences in contributions by gender and history
of participation are insignificant. Column 2 further indicates that contributions are
positively and significantly correlated with participants’ altruism (as gauged by sur-
vey responses).21 The coefficients on leader status, age, off-farm income and altruism
retain statistical significance in the combined regression (Column 3). These results
thereby indicate that more powerful, older, wealthy, and more altruistic individuals
contribute larger absolute amounts.
Table 3: Individual Correlates of Voucher Contributions
Voucher contribution
(1) (2) (3)
Leader 2.607** 2.309*
(1.224) (1.269)
Female -0.547 -0.560
(0.887) (0.908)
Young -2.068* -2.357**
(1.091) (1.089)
Off-Farm Income 2.514* 2.350*
(1.336) (1.392)
No Assets -0.970 -1.567
(1.383) (1.367)
Marginalized -1.073 -0.967
(1.043) (1.028)
Altruism 0.580*** 0.549**
(0.204) (0.205)
Constant 29.97*** 24.61*** 26.08***
(2.750) (3.167) (2.915)
N 787 755 755
Adj. R-sq 0.023 0.016 0.033
Note: All regressions include province fixed-effects.
Standard errors clustered at the village
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Voucher contributions are also correlated with active participation in the discus-
20At the village level, the share of better off and poor participants is not significantly correlated
with total contribution levels in the SCA.
21Other survey measures of trust and reciprocity are not significantly correlated with contribution
levels.
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sion and perceptions of fairness in process and outcomes. Subjects who spoke during
the discussion contributed on average SBD 30.1, while those who did not contributed
SBD 27.2 (p = .001). Participants who perceive the selection process as fair and are
satisfied with the project choice each contribute SBD 2 more than those who do not,
although these differences are not statistically significant (p = .385 and p = .106,
respectively).22
4.2.4 Project Implementation
Three months after the selection process, only a quarter of communities had been
able to obtain the necessary materials from the hardware suppliers for which the
credits were issued. Qualitative evidence garnered by enumerators indicated that
most of the communities that had not obtained the materials had been constrained
from doing so by remoteness and the infrequency of transport services.
5 Results
The following subsections report results for the tests of the aforementioned hypothe-
ses. In particular, the subsections report estimates of the effect of the treatment
on the selection process; on selection outcomes; on perceptions of and satisfaction
with the process; and on implementation outcomes. For each set of results, we both
estimate the treatment effect and examine heterogeneity in treatment effects.
5.1 Effect on Selection Process
5.1.1 Treatment Effect
In order to estimate the effect of the treatment on the selection process, we fit the
following participant-level equation:
yiv = β1Treativ + β2Provincev + uiv
where yiv is the probability of participant i in community v speaking (Column
1), the number of of five minute intervals during which participant i in community v
22In Section 6 we discuss the relationship between contributions, baseline preferences and selection
outcomes.
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spoke (Column 3),23 and a summary index of these two outcome variables (Column
5).24 Treat is a binary variable indicating whether community v was assigned to the
treatment or control group; and Province represents a matrix of binary variables for
each province.
Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 4 report the results. Column 5 indicates that, per the
aggregate outcome measure, the treatment has a positive effect on participation and
that the effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Vouchers thus gen-
erally increase participation in the selection process by 0.13 standard deviation units
(the minimum effect detectable in our sample at the 10% level is approximately 0.12
SD units; at the 5% level it is 0.15 SD units). While it is feasible that this increase
may arise as a result of coordination among participants on contribution strategies,
facilitators reported that such discussions happened in only a few villages.25
5.1.2 Effect Heterogeneity
In order to estimate how the treatment affects different types of participants, we fit
the following participant-level equation:
yiv = β1Treativ + β2IndChariv + β3Treativ · IndChariv + Provincev + uiv
where IndChariv is a vector of one the following characteristics of participant i:
leader; female; young (under 30); off-farm income source; no assets. The analysis
adjusts for the increased potential for false positives due to multiple comparisons by
adjusting the p-values for the false discovery rate (Anderson, 2008) and reporting
sharpened q-values.26
Columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 4 report regression results. While the results show
that leaders and subjects with off-farm income are more likely to speak and women
and young persons are less likely to do so, there is no evidence of that treatment
23Given that the probability of speaking in the meeting was affected by the treatment, the analysis
of speaking intervals does not censor this outcome at participation equals one, but always considers
the unconditional outcome. We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion.
24This addresses the multiple comparisons problem. The methodology follows Anderson (2008).
25The relatively wide distribution of contributions within villages suggest that, if any such coordi-
nation took place, it was not particularly effective. Specifically, the difference between the smallest
and the largest contributions is greater than SBD 30 in 60 percent of the villages.
26This adjustment is performed in all regressions with multiple interaction terms.
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Table 4: Effect on Selection Process
Prob. Speaking No. Interventions Weighted Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.0413 0.0461 0.162* 0.233* 0.130* 0.175*
(0.0331) (0.0430) (0.0858) (0.126) (0.0728) (0.0962)
Leader 0.337*** 0.699*** 0.710***
(0.0471) (0.0968) (0.0842)
Female -0.201*** -0.466*** -0.446***
(0.0280) (0.0664) (0.0525)
Young -0.207*** -0.383*** -0.409***
(0.0340) (0.0779) (0.0701)
Off-Farm Income 0.114** 0.203** 0.220**
(0.0519) (0.0994) (0.0985)
No Assets -0.0281 -0.112 -0.0853
(0.0398) (0.0769) (0.0752)
Treatment x Leader -0.0196 0.147 0.0392
(0.0624) (0.147) (0.122)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Treatment x Female 0.00120 -0.136 -0.0703
(0.0396) (0.107) (0.0831)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Treatment x Young 0.0160 -0.0837 -0.0333
(0.0531) (0.105) (0.102)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Treatment x Off-Farm -0.0308 -0.0743 -0.0699
(0.0740) (0.177) (0.157)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Treatment x No Assets -0.0320 0.0478 -0.0109
(0.0571) (0.140) (0.123)
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Constant 0.419*** 0.538*** 0.684*** 0.956*** -0.0467 0.214***
(0.0334) (0.0361) (0.0896) (0.101) (0.0757) (0.0801)
N 1600 1600 1548 1548 1548 1548
Adj. R-sq 0.032 0.161 0.055 0.209 0.041 0.201
Note: All regressions include province fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses
parentheses, FDR-adjusted q-values in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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changes the nature of participation by any of the respective sub-groups.27
Of particular interest is the effect of the treatment on marginalized individuals
who had not actively participated in previous community meetings (see Section 4.2).
While such participants were 32 percentage points less likely than non-marginalized
participants to speak during the discussion in control villages (p = .000), the treat-
ment significantly increases their involvement in the discussion. Figure 3 shows the
effect of the treatment on the probability of speaking (left) and the number of inter-
ventions (right). While the general effect on both outcomes is positive overall, the
effect for marginalized participants is larger and attains a higher level of statistical
significance (two-sided t-test p = .001 and p = .0001 for the probability of speaking
and number of interventions, respectively).28
5.2 Effects on Selection Outcomes
5.2.1 Treatment Effect
Figure 1 compares selection outcomes in the treatment and control villages with the
ex-ante primary preferences of participant villagers and participant leaders. Sanita-
tion projects were selected less frequently in treatment (2.5%) than control commu-
nities (17.5%; p = .025), while health projects were selected more frequently (15%
vs. 2.5%; p = .049).
To identify the overall effect of the treatment on the pattern of selection outcomes,
we follow Chattopadhyay and Dulfo (2004) in estimating a series of community-level
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). As there is an imbalance between treatment
and control groups in baseline preferences over projects,29 we include controls for all
imbalanced baseline preferences in the regression equation:
yv = β1Treatv + β2Prefv + β3Provincev + uiv
27These results are robust to controlling for imbalanced preferences over project types overall and
by leaders, women, and younger participants.
28As shown in Table A3, the results on the probability of speaking retain statistical significance at
the 10% level when adding controls for individual characteristics, their interaction with treatment
and imbalanced preferences over project types. The difference in impacts on the weighted index
is also large (0.19 SD) but loses statistical significance after adjusting for the multiple subgroup
testing.
29Specifically, health projects were more preferred in the treatment group, overall and by women
and young people, and sanitation projects were more strongly preferred by leaders in the treatment
group
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Figure 3: Treatment Effect on Participation by Marginalization Status
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where yv is a binary variable that assumes a value of one if the respective project
type was selected in community v and Prefv is a vector of baseline preferences over
project types.
Table 5 reports the results of the estimation, which confirm that the treatment
increased the probability that health projects were selected and reduced the prob-
ability of sanitation projects being selected (both effects are statistically significant
at the 5 percent level). A Wald test of joint significance of the treatment coefficients
shows that vouchers significantly affected selection outcomes (p = .073). The min-
imum effect detectable in our sample at the 5% level varies by project type, from
roughly 4.7 pp for church buildings to 19.7 pp for water systems.
Table 5: Effect of Vouchers on Project Choice
Treatment
coeff. (s.e.)
Dependent variable: selected project is
Kindergarten 0.0500
(0.0944)
Primary School 0.0250
(0.0414)
Health center 0.126**
(0.0598)
Market building 0.0500
(0.0340)
Water system -0.0729
(0.0984)
Sanitation -0.145**
(0.0635)
Community building -0.0500
(0.0861)
Church building 0.0250
(0.0242)
N 80
Note: SUR estimation. All regressions include province f.e. and imbalanced baseline preferences
over project types. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In order to determine whether the treatment resulted in the selection of projects
that were more aligned with the preferences of leaders, general participants, or those
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who were ex-ante marginalized, we regress, on the treatment, a binary variable that
indicates whether the selected project corresponded with the modal priority prefer-
ences of the respective group. In the event of a tie in preferences, correspondence is
checked with either of the respective preferences: for instance, in the case of leaders,
a project is defined as matching leaders’ preferences if it was either the male or the
female leader’s top-ranked project type.30 Regressions of this variable are run at
the community level on a treatment indicator, province fixed effects and controls for
imbalanced preferences over project types overall and by leaders and marginalized
individuals.
Table 6 reports the results of the estimation, which indicates that the treatment
has no statistically significant effect on the probability of the selected project corre-
sponding with the preferences of general participants, leaders, or participants who
were ex-ante marginalized, or on a weighted index of all three.31 The minimum effect
on the weighted index detectable at the 5% level in our sample is 0.47 SD units. This
constrains what we can conclude from these cross-village average impact estimates
on the correspondence of preferences and project choices. However, we do find that
within sets of villages with varying levels of initial agreement and leader altruism,
more precise impact estimates are possible, as discussed below.
5.2.2 Effect Heterogeneity
Differences in leader and villager preferences may arise as a result of differences in
interests or of differences in information on the relative benefits of projects (Kosfeld
and Rustagi, 2015). Where information asymmetries cause differences in preferences,
the resolution of the asymmetry in the course of the discussion may cause villagers to
adopt leaders preferences, resulting in minimal elite capture despite the appearance
of such. To isolate the effect of the treatment on ’interest-driven’ elite capture (as
opposed to more benign forms of ‘information-driven’ elite capture), the treatment
is interacted with measures of the altruism of participating leaders:32
30Out of 31 instances of selected projects matching leaders’ preferences, 7 correspond to cases in
which male and female leaders preferences are aligned. Of the remaining instances, male leaders’
preferences are matched by project choice in 16 cases, and female leaders’ in 8 cases.
31No statistically significant effects of treatment are observed if we examine agreement with male
and female leaders separately. Results available upon request.
32The approach assumes that the selection discussion enables villagers to discover whether leaders
preferences are driven by information or interest and that, in the case of the former, that villagers
will accede to the leaders preferences, weakening the treatment effect.
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Table 6: Effect of Vouchers on Correspondence between Selected Project and Par-
ticipant Preferences
Correspondence btw. Index
project and preferences
All Leader Marg
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.0805 0.0594 0.130 0.0745
(0.103) (0.109) (0.106) (0.236)
Constant 0.00202 0.117 0.0565 -0.0962
(0.125) (0.132) (0.129) (0.286)
N 80 80 80 80
Adj. R-sq 0.139 0.159 0.110 0.048
Note: All regressions include province f.e. and imbalanced
baseline preferences over project types. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
yv = β1Treatv + β2AltrLeadv + β3Treatv ·AltrLeadv + β4Prefv + β5Provincev + uv
where yv represents correspondence between the selected project and the prefer-
ences of the respective group and AltrLeadv represents the willingness of the group’s
leaders to share resources with others when nothing is expected in return (see Section
4.1).
The corresponding estimates are reported in Column 1 of Table 7 and indicate
that the treatment differentially improves the correspondence between participants’
preferences and selection outcomes where the leader is less altruistic.33 Columns 3,
5 and 7 estimate the interaction effects on the correspondence between the selected
project and leader preferences, marginalized villager preferences, and a weighted
index of the three outcome variables, respectively. The coefficients are statistically
insignificant at conventional levels.
In order to identify how the effects of the treatment are conditioned by the cor-
respondence of preferences of leaders and marginalized participants, the treatment
is interacted with a binary measure indicating disagreement between the preferences
33The coefficient on the un-interacted treatment effect (which indicates what happens where
leaders are not altruistic) has the expected sign, but is insignificant.
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Table 7: Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects on Project Selection
Correspondence btw project and preferences Index
All Leader Marg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treat. 0.850 -0.251 0.126 0.0848 0.588 -0.0833 2.132 -0.423
(0.631) (0.202) (0.702) (0.222) (0.676) (0.213) (1.489) (0.474)
Altruistic leader 0.0463 -0.0149 0.0379 0.157
(0.0445) (0.0487) (0.0470) (0.106)
Treat x Altruistic -0.122* -0.0110 -0.0725 -0.265
(0.0724) (0.0802) (0.0777) (0.172)
Disagreement -0.116 -0.150 -0.193 -0.325
(0.140) (0.165) (0.148) (0.330)
Treat x Disagreement 0.263 -0.0120 0.201 0.914*
(0.208) (0.232) (0.219) (0.486)
Constant -0.311 0.140 0.276 0.177 -0.198 0.196 -1.547 0.0149
(0.426) (0.147) (0.458) (0.154) (0.445) (0.156) (1.017) (0.359)
N 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Adj. R-sq 0.183 0.169 0.119 0.139 0.084 0.094 0.034 0.044
Note: All regressions include province x treatment fixed-effects and control for imbalanced preferences over
project types. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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of these two groups.34 The even Columns of Table 7 indicate that, while neither the
treatment nor the interaction have a statistically significant effect on the correspon-
dence between selection outcomes and group preferences when entered individually,
the interacted treatment effect is statistically significant at the 10% level when corre-
spondences with the different populations’ preferences are combined into a weighted
index. Specifically, the treatment increases the correspondence between the selected
project and the preferences of marginalized and non-leader participants in those cases
where marginalized and leader participants have distinct preferences.35
As the treatment may be conditioned by social capital, we also explore inter-
actions between the treatment and community characteristics that may affect co-
operation between villagers, including the size of the community, number of tribal
factions, nature of local economic activity,36 distance to the provincial center, and
average level of altruism. Accordingly, we estimate the following equation:
yv = β1Treatv + β2V illCharv + β3Treatv · V illCharv + β4Prefv + β5Provincev + uv
where V illCharv represents the respective characteristic of community v.
Columns 1 and 6 of Table 8 show that the treatment induces a statistically signif-
icant increase in the probability of correspondence between selection outcomes and
leader preferences in large communities.37 This effect is, however, at least partially
offset by the statistically significant reduction in the probability of correspondence
induced by village size. In villages that are located far from the provincial center,
the treatment reduces the probability of correspondence between leader preferences
and selection outcomes, although this effect is also offset by the un-interacted effect
of distance on the probability of correspondence.
34We thus run the same specification as above, only replacing leader altruism with a binary
indicator for divergent preferences.
35The minimum difference in effects across these preference disagreement types that is detectable
in our data at the 5% confidence level is 0.97. Our estimated difference is 0.91.
36Off-farm income is positively and significantly correlated with voucher contributions and posi-
tively correlated with asset ownership.
37In addition to including all covariates, Column 6 reports multiple inference adjusted q-values
so as to correct for multiple testing.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects on Project Selection by Village Char-
acteristics
Match between project choice and leader preferences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -0.05 -0.056 0.035 0.287* -0.024 -1.027
(0.117) (0.197) (0.172) (0.169) (1.035) (1.064)
Large -0.395** -0.449*
(0.186) (0.226)
Treat x Large 0.578** 0.944***
(0.256) (0.325)
[0.029]
No. Tribal Groups -0.011 0.002
(0.025) (0.025)
Treatment x Tribal Groups 0.026 -0.04
(0.034) (0.038)
[0.213]
Off-Farm -0.547 0.733
(0.970) (0.986)
Treatment x Off-Farm 0.262 -1.479
(1.193) (1.274)
[0.213]
Remote 0.201 0.379**
(0.148) (0.161)
Treatment x Remote -0.328 -0.492**
(0.216) (0.232)
[0.084]
Altruism -0.034 -0.211**
(0.099) (0.104)
Treatment x altruism 0.01 0.201
(0.124) (0.132)
[0.157]
Constant 0.125 0.091 0.176 -0.109 0.380 1.469*
(0.137) (0.167) (0.172) (0.166) (0.813) (0.808)
N 78 76 80 72 80 70
Adj. R-sq. 0.320 0.277 0.246 0.365 0.243 0.472
Note: all regressions include province fixed-effects and imbalanced baseline preferences over project
types. Robust standard errors in parentheses, FDR-adjusted q-values in brackets.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5.3 Effects on Perceptions of and Satisfaction with Process
5.3.1 Treatment Effect
In order to estimate the effect of the treatment on participants’ perceptions of and
satisfaction with the selection process, we estimate the following participant-level
equation:
yiv = β1Treatv + β2Leaderi + β3Margi + β4Femalei + β5Y oungi + β6No.Asseti
+ β7OffFarmi + β8Provincev + uiv
where yiv represents a binary measure of whether participant i in community v
perceived the selection process was fair or a measure of whether said participant was
satisfied with the selection outcome;38 Leaderi is a binary variable that assumes a
value of one if participant i is a leader; Margi is a binary variable that assumes
a value of one if participant i is marginalized; Femalei is a binary variable that
assumes a value of one if participant i is female; Y oungi is a binary variable that
assumes a value of one if participant i is under 30; No.Asseti is a binary variable
that assumes a value of one if participant i has no assets; and OffFarmi is a binary
variable that assumes a value of one if participant i has off-farm income.
Table 9 reports the respective estimates. Perceived fairness (86% in control vil-
lages) and satisfaction (87% in control villages) are generally high (see Table 2). The
treatment increases perceived fairness by 5.5 percentage points and satisfaction by
6.0 percentage points, with these effects significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent
level, respectively.39 The effect on the weighted index is estimated to be 0.20 SD
units, a substantively large effect (the minimum detectable effect in our sample is
0.14 SD units). The results also indicate that leaders are more likely to perceive the
process as fair, while marginalized individuals are less likely to perceive the process
38Data is provided by participants responses to the questions: “Do you think the project was
chosen in an equitable and fair way?” and “Are you personally satisfied with the project that was
selected today?”.
39While we cannot completely discount the possibility that these effects are driven by the direct
effect of granting vouchers to participants rather than through the indirect effect of improving the
quality of the selection process per se, there exists a positive and statistically significant correlation
between participation in the discussion and both perceptions and satisfaction. In addition, par-
ticipants that spoke during the discussion made higher voucher contributions, on average. There
thus exists prima facie evidence to indicate that the improvement in perceptions and satisfaction
is driven by the increase in the quality of discussion rather than the mere provision of vouchers.
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as fair and are less likely to be satisfied with the outcome.
Table 9: Effect of Voucher on Satisfaction with Decision Process and Outcome
Fair process Satisfied Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.0549** -0.0138 0.0601*** 0.0122 0.204*** -0.00179
(0.0227) (0.0292) (0.0202) (0.0235) (0.0706) (0.0833)
Leader 0.0582*** 0.0357 0.0191 0.0224 0.135* 0.102
(0.0215) (0.0323) (0.0217) (0.0305) (0.0715) (0.108)
Marg. -0.0486** -0.107*** -0.0624*** -0.106*** -0.197*** -0.377***
(0.0228) (0.0289) (0.0204) (0.0272) (0.0707) (0.0874)
Treat x Leader 0.0466 -0.00571 0.0701
(0.0420) (0.0425) (0.141)
[0.157] [0.808] [0.452]
Treat x Marg. 0.117*** 0.0884*** 0.362***
(0.0386) (0.0328) (0.115)
[0.007] [0.018] [0.005]
Female -0.0393* -0.0384* -0.0355 -0.0347 -0.132* -0.129*
(0.0218) (0.0220) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0739) (0.0746)
Young 0.0742*** 0.0726*** 0.0633*** 0.0616*** 0.243*** 0.237***
(0.0185) (0.0178) (0.0190) (0.0185) (0.0609) (0.0587)
No asset -0.0103 -0.00727 -0.0103 -0.00753 -0.0364 -0.0262
(0.0262) (0.0259) (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0859) (0.0850)
Off farm 0.00327 0.000620 0.0126 0.0107 0.0285 0.0206
(0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0197) (0.0200) (0.0615) (0.0619)
Constant 0.935*** 0.971*** 0.954*** 0.979*** 0.186** 0.293***
(0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0243) (0.0228) (0.0873) (0.0819)
N 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600
Adj. R-sq 0.053 0.059 0.054 0.058 0.064 0.070
Note: All regressions include province fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered at the village
level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5.3.2 Effect Heterogeneity
In addition to the overall treatment effect, we are also interested in whether the
treatment affects the perceptions and satisfaction of leaders and marginalized par-
ticipants differently than other types of participants. Accordingly, we estimate the
following participant-level equation:
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yiv = β1Treatv + β2Leaderi + β3Margi + β4Treatv · Leaderi
+ β5Treatv ·Margi + β6Femalei + β7Y oungi + β8No.Asseti
+ β9OffFarmi + β10Provincev + uiv
The results are reported in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 9. While the treatment
does not significantly affect leaders perceptions or satisfaction with the process, it
significantly increases both outcomes for marginalized individuals. All these findings
hold for the weighted index of these outcomes (Columns 5 and 6).40
5.4 Effects on Project Implementation
5.4.1 Treatment Effect
Notwithstanding the constrained sample and the lack of variation in the outcome
indicator relating to project implementation (Section 4.2.4), we estimate the effect
of the treatment on the project implementation via the following community-level
regression:
yv = β1Treatv + β2Provincev + uv
Column 1 in Table 10 shows how the available data indicates that the treatment
had no effect on the probability of materials being picked-up in the three months
following the meeting.
5.4.2 Effect Heterogeneity
We also examine effect heterogeneity by interacting the treatment with a binary
variable indicating whether the community lies farther than the median travel time
from the respective provincial center. The following community-level equation is
fitted:
yv = β1Treatv + β2Farv + β3Treatv · Farv + β5Provincev + uv
40We further test the robustness of these results by controlling for imbalanced preferences over
projects and separately interacting the treatment with individual characteristics and find qualita-
tively consistent results.
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Table 10: Effect on implementation
Picked up materials
(1) (2)
Treatment -0.0122 0.262
(0.111) (0.181)
Far from prov.ctr. 0.241
(0.170)
Treatment x far -0.290
(0.246)
Constant 0.156 -0.0697
(0.114) (0.169)
N 65 58
Adj. R-sq 0.031 0.058
Note: All regressions include province fixed-effects.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
As with the basic regression, we find no evidence to indicate that the treat-
ment affected the probability of the participants retrieving materials to complete the
project, regardless of whether the community was closer to or farther away from the
respective provincial center.
6 Discussion
While vouchers significantly change the pattern of projects that are selected, the
modality does not reduce the probability of correspondence between the selected
project and the ex-ante preferences of leaders and does not increase the probabil-
ity of correspondence between the selected project and the ex-ante preferences of
marginalized and/or non-leader participants. Prima facie, such results suggest that
vouchers have no impact on elite capture. However, vouchers do increase the du-
ration of discussions and the number of participants that contribute to discussions
and it is feasible that, with these improvements in the quality of discussions, partic-
ipants may update their preferences. Accordingly, the correspondence between the
selected project and participants’ ex-ante preferences may not be informative as a
true measure of elite capture. In order to better understand whether the change in
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the pattern of selected projects that is induced by vouchers is likely to be beneficial to
non-leader participants, we further examine the absolute and relative characteristics
of projects selected in treatment communities.
First, we examine the relationship between selected and ex-ante preferred projects
and voucher contributions in treatment communities (Figure 4). If participants’
preferences are not significantly affected by the discussion, we would expect partic-
ipants to contribute more where the selected project corresponds with their ex-ante
preferred project. However, when we compare vouchers contributions and baseline
project preferences, we observe little correlation between the two distributions. This
visual impression is confirmed when we regress participant’s voucher contribution
on a binary variable that denotes the correspondence between selected projects and
the same participant’s and top-ranked project:41 we find that participants do not
contribute significantly more when their ex-ante preferred project is selected.42 Ac-
cordingly, there is indicative evidence that discussions alter participants’ preferences.
Second, we examine whether the treatment led to the selection of projects that
are in greater need of funding, as proxied by survey data on community members per-
ceptions of improvements in the quality of different public facilities over the previous
five years. Specifically, we run village-level SURs of the probability that a specific
project type is selected on the interaction between treatment and an indicator of per-
ceived past improvements, controlling for baseline project preferences and province
fixed-effects. However, we find no statistically significant effect of the treatment on
the likelihood that previously un-improved projects were selected (p = .239).
Finally, we further examine whether the treatment led to the selection of projects
which complemented on-going projects funded by RDP. The assumption is that the
limited funding provided through the experiment could be put to better use for
incremental improvements or maintenance activities of existing public goods, rather
than for constructing new ones. We run village-level SURs of the likelihood that
a specific project type is selected on the interaction between the treatment and an
indicator of RDP-selected project type, controlling for baseline project preferences
and province fixed-effects. Again, we do not find any statistically significant effect of
the treatment on the likelihood that the experiment and RDP-selected project types
match (p = .210). However, there exists a correlation between the distribution of
41The regression specification also controls for individual characteristics, imbalanced baseline
preferences over project types, and province fixed-effects.
42The regression coefficient indicates that contributions are 1.997 SBD higher on average when
there is a match (s.e. = 1.306; p = .134). Results available upon request.
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Figure 4: Preferences over Projects and Voucher Contributions by Type of Selected
Project
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Figure 5: Experiment and RDP-selected project types, by treatment
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projects chosen during the experiment and RDP projects. Specifically, a chi-square
test cannot reject the hypothesis that projects selected by the experiment and RDP
are drawn from the same distribution in treated villages (chi2 = 91.8; p = .000),
but does rejects the hypothesis for control communities (chi2 = 34.981; p = .770).43
Figure 5 shows the frequency of projects selected by the experiment and by RDP in
treated and control villages and confirms the closer correspondence between the two
variables in the former set of villages.
Overall, these results suggest that the increase in the quality of discussion induced
by the voucher-based modality changes participant preferences and promotes a more
rational allocation of resources to improve existing public goods.
43The distribution of RDP-selected projects does not differ between treated and control villages.
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7 Conclusions
In order to both improve the correspondence between development projects and
local preferences and to encourage increased citizen participation in project imple-
mentation, development programming has become increasingly decentralized over
recent decades. However, the equity and efficiency of such programs has been ham-
pered by limited participation among community members and by the propensity of
local elites to exercise undue influence over project selection. While various initia-
tives such as community fora, referenda, and community participatory monitoring
- have been devised to constrain elite capture and increase community involvement,
these have experienced limited success. This paper presents an alternative scheme
which seeks to reduce elite capture and increase community engagement by providing
vouchers to community members participating in a local resource allocation exercise.
The effects of the voucher scheme on the nature of selection processes, selection
outcomes, and implementation outcomes are tested using a randomized controlled
trial covering 80 villages in the Solomon Islands. All sample villages were provided
with SBD 2,000 to allocate to a community project to be selected by a group of 18
villagers and 2 village leaders. In 40 of these villages, members of the group were
provided with vouchers that could either be redeemed for a private good or allocated
to the community project. In the other 40 villages, project funding was provided
through standard block grants.
Estimates from the experiment indicate that vouchers increase the duration of the
discussion and the probability of otherwise-marginalized individuals participating in
the discussion. There is also evidence that vouchers change the type of projects se-
lected and, while there is no general evidence that vouchers alter the probability of
selected projects corresponding with participant preferences, there is some evidence
that vouchers increase the probability of marginalized individuals realizing their pref-
erences when those preferences disagree with those of leaders. In addition, vouchers
improve the perceived fairness of and satisfaction with the selection process among
both participants generally, and marginalized participants specifically.
Potentially due to the limited progress in project implementation observed across
the sample in the three months after the study, the available data does not provide
any indication that vouchers affect project implementation outcomes. Nonetheless,
the improvement that vouchers induce in participant involvement and community
satisfaction provides reason to suggest that, over a longer time period, vouchers may
35
potentially increase the involvement of community members in project monitoring
and, in so doing, improve the quality of implemented projects. On the other hand,
however, as redeemable vouchers also generally reduce the funding that is provided
to public works projects, it is feasible the vouchers may constrain the scope of funded
project and thereby the benefits offered by such projects. Exploring the longer-term
effects on project outcomes of the use of vouchers in community project selection is
an important avenue for subsequent research.
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Appendix
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Table A1: Participation in Previous Community Meetings
Attended and Spoke
(1)
Leader 0.263***
(0.036)
Female -0.261***
(0.027)
Young -0.125***
(0.028)
No assets -0.035
(0.034)
Off farm 0.085**
(0.037)
Constant 0.531***
(0.036)
N 1600
Adj. R-sq 0.141
Note: All regressions include province fixed-effects.
Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2: Preferences over project types by sub-group
Kindy Pr.sch. Health Roads Mkt. Water Sanit. Comm. Church
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
All 0.256 0.518 0.018 0.384 0.115 1.000 0.354 0.483 0.541
Leader 1.000 0.333 0.356 1.000 0.631 0.075 0.024 0.507 0.567
Female 0.297 0.844 0.085 0.649 0.041 0.879 0.353 0.851 0.154
Young 0.361 0.296 0.086 0.041 0.891 0.564 0.958 0.978 0.401
No asset 0.689 0.181 0.135 0.604 0.190 0.955 0.858 0.218 0.983
Off farm 0.401 0.465 0.600 0.888 0.217 0.685 0.996 0.470 0.276
Marg. (a) 0.241 0.987 0.027 0.174 0.542 0.993 0.527 0.439 0.973
Note: p-values from regressions of outcome on treatment and province fixed-effects. Standard errors
clustered at the village level. (a) didn’t speak or attend prior community meetings.
Table A3: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect on Selection Process
Speaker No. Interv. Index
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment -0.00964 0.182 0.0976
(0.0473) (0.149) (0.112)
Marginalised -0.287*** -0.526*** -0.556***
(0.0436) (0.0903) (0.0859)
Treat x Marg. 0.124** 0.132 0.191*
(0.0533) (0.121) (0.107)
[0.097] [0.871] [0.525]
Constant 0.673*** 1.200*** 0.472***
(0.0407) (0.111) (0.0887)
N 1600 1548 1548
Adj. R-sq 0.201 0.244 0.242
Note: All regressions include individual controls (leader, female,
young, no assets, off-farm income), their interaction with
treatment, imbalanced baseline preferences over projects and
province fixed-effects. Standard errors clustered at the village
level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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